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Abstract 
 
Applying the general question of aid effectiveness to the sector of education, this paper 
provides some evidence for a positive effect of development assistance on primary 
enrolment and completion. However, even the most optimistic estimates clearly show 
that at any realistic rate of growth, aid will never be able to move the world markedly 
closer towards the internationally agreed objective of “Education For All”. Universal 
primary education requires increased efficiency of educational spending by donors and 
national governments alike. Moreover, there is some evidence that the recipient 
countries’ general political and institutional background matters. Under conditions of 
bad governance, the impact of aid on enrolment can actually turn negative. 
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1 Introduction 
In the late 1990s, the World Bank study on aid effectiveness (World Bank 1998) 
provoked a general debate, both among aid agencies and in academia, on the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of development assistance. Evidence available at micro 
level typically provides strong support for the effectiveness of aid. Donor agencies tend 
to carry out regular project evaluations and publish overall statistics in which the share 
of “successful“ projects generally varies between 70 and 90% (Michaelowa and 
Borrmann 2006). 
At macro level, however, the available evidence leads to results which are less robust by 
far. Empirical investigations have often failed to find a significantly positive link 
between aid and economic development. Boone (1996) even provides convincing 
evidence for a negative rather than a positive relationship. The World Bank study as 
well as Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) paper resuming the study’s main arguments 
conclude that the missing link between aid and growth may be due to donors’ 
insufficient attention to governance issues within recipient countries. In fact, their 
econometric results show a positive effect of aid on growth wherever good governance 
is prevailing. One major argument in this context is the fungibility of resources. In 
recipient countries with “bad governance” governments might substitute the aid funds 
for national public expenditure in the sectors towards which the aid flows are directed, 
and use the released national funds for unproductive expenditure such as the purchase of 
arms or increased consumption. Hansen and Tarp (2001) contradict these results on 
econometric grounds and provide evidence for an overall positive effect of aid. At the 
same time, Easterly (2001, 2002, 2003, 2006) questions the effectiveness of aid 
altogether, independently of governance in the recipient countries, arguing, inter alia, on 
the basis of inefficiencies on the donor side. Harms and Lutz (2004) as well as 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2005) present a comprehensive overview of the literature 
available so far.  
It is the objective of this paper to evaluate the apparently contradictory evidence on aid 
effectiveness at the example of a specific sector: education. A sectoral approach avoids 
the extremely high complexity of macro level evaluations in which it is virtually 
impossible to acknowledge for all factors with potential impacts on the link between aid 
and economic development. At the same time, as opposed to micro level project 
assessments, sectoral analysis should be able to reveal the relevance of fungibility and 
the impact of good governance. Finally, sectoral data can be drawn from international 
statistics which appear to be more reliable than micro level project evaluation data 
generated by bilateral development agencies. 
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The advantage of the education sector is primarily that development objectives in this 
field have been set out very clearly and have been agreed upon among all international 
donors at various occasions. Declarations adopted at the “Education For All” (EFA) 
international fora in Jomptien 1990 and Dakar 2000, as well as the “Millennium 
Development Goals” (MDGs) adopted both at the UN level and in the framework of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD donor countries (OECD/DAC 
2001, p. 18), all call for universal primary education as a major priority of poverty 
alleviation and general development policy. 
In this paper, the impact of aid for education on the development of primary enrolment 
rates will be assessed in a dynamic panel analysis for about 120 low- and lower-middle 
income countries. While Section 2 discusses the data used for the econometric analysis, 
Section 3 describes the econometric approach and presents the results under different 
empirical assumptions and based on two different data sets: a long-term structural panel 
(five-year averages, 1975-2000) and a short-term annual panel (1993-2000). Section 4 
draws some conclusions of this sectoral study in the context of the wider debate on aid 
effectiveness. 
 
2 Data and variable selection 
In order to carry out the analysis outlined above, information is required on primary 
education outcomes as well as on aid allocated to education in the different recipient 
countries. Moreover, various control variables related to the recipient countries’ national 
education expenditure, specificities of the local education systems, the overall level of 
economic development, and some indicators of governance, need to be introduced.  
In particular, reliable data on development cooperation are crucial for the assessment of 
aid effectiveness. Generally, this type of information can be drawn from the 
International Development Statistics (IDS) compiled by the DAC secretariat 
(OECD/DAC 2004). Typically, aid data are provided either in terms of commitments or 
in terms of disbursements. As commitments do not always translate into actual flows of 
resources and as, even if they do, the delay does not always follow a systematic pattern, 
the aid data used should be preferably based on disbursements. However, information 
on disbursements by sector of development assistance is available only from 1990 
onwards. Similarly, for technical cooperation which, according to the DAC statisticians, 
is more accurate in terms of the sectoral break up, data are available only since 1992. 
For this reason, both of these series can be used only for an analysis of the impact of aid 
within the 1990s. In order to increase the number of observations, the panel based on 
this dataset uses annual observations, even though one-year steps may not be sufficient 
to show the impact of structural variables with little variation over time. 
In order to assess long-term developments and the impact of structural variables, the 
only alternative is to use the data on aid commitments which are available throughout 
the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Unfortunately, until recently, donor reporting to this database 
(Creditor Reporting System, CRS) has remained incomplete; a fact that becomes most 
obvious when the total amount reported to the CRS database is compared to the total 
amount published in general DAC statistics. However, under the assumption that the 
sectoral share as provided in the CRS data is correct, an approximation of the true 
commitment data can be derived using the correct total from DAC statistics. This 
transformation is equivalent to a simple expansion of the sectoral information available 
from CRS:  
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where EDUCAID = aid for education; TOTALODA = total official development 
assistance. The subscripts denote the respective sources (DAC versus CRS databank). 
All other variables can be directly drawn from international databases.  
As far as the measurement of progress towards universal primary education is 
concerned, the indicators to be used have been agreed internationally along with the 
definition of the MDGs’ goal no. 2 on education. They include the net primary 
enrolment rate, persistence to grade 5 and the primary completion rate. Persistence to 
grade 5 always requires a simultaneous consideration of enrolment because it is defined 
only with respect to those students who initially enter the education system. The 
combination of both aspects is captured in the completion rates which relate the number 
of students completing primary education to the total number of children of the 
corresponding age group. The only disadvantage is that for completion (just as for 
enrolment) there is no specific final grade level identified, so that different durations of 
primary education may distort international comparability for those countries which 
significantly differ from the typical duration of five or six years. Nevertheless, the net 
enrolment rate (NER) and the primary completion rate (COMPLETION) appear to be 
the most appropriate variables in the context of our analysis.  
Unfortunately, there are considerable problems of data availability. The only 
educational indicator for which a reasonably complete coverage exists over the years is 
gross primary enrolment. However, its message is difficult to interpret as more than 
 4 
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50% of the observations exceed 100%. The reason is that, as opposed to the net 
enrolment rate which only considers pupils of the appropriate age, the gross enrolment 
rate considers pupils of any age and compares them to the (much more restricted) 
number of children of official primary school age. Thus the gross enrolment rate is 
inflated by late enrolment and grade repetition which is substantial in some countries, 
notably in Africa and Latin America, and its increase may reflect an increase in 
inefficiency rather than a true increase in enrolment.  
Fortunately, the simultaneous consideration of direct information on the efficiency of 
the education system (e.g. persistence and repetition rates) can mitigate this deficiency. 
Moreover, even the gender balance (in both primary and secondary education) provides 
complementary information. Note that whenever there is close to universal enrolment, 
the gender-ratio must be close to one, which is generally not the case otherwise. 
For the purpose of this study, we thus combine all the information available on gross 
enrolment and on the additional indicators mentioned above, and use it to derive revised 
and more comprehensive data on NER and COMPLETION. All imputations are based 
on linear regressions with subsequent trimming to ensure that the imputed values are in 
the support of the underlying variables. 
All relevant educational indicators are available from the UNESCO-UIS (2006) 
statistical database. For convenience, they can also be drawn together with other 
macroeconomic variables from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI). However, the most recent WDI database (World Bank 2005) does no more 
include the older UNESCO statistics (up to 1997), so that it has to be used jointly with 
the WDI 2003 database (World Bank 2003). 
In order to characterize the national education systems in recipient countries, 
information on current education expenditure in percent of GNI (EXPEDUC), the pupil-
teacher ratio in primary education (PTR), and the share of children and youths aged 0-
14 as a percentage of overall population (YOUNG-POP) are selected as potentially 
relevant variables. GDP per capita (GDPcap) is added as a variable controlling for the 
recipient countries’ general income level. Information on each of these variables is 
available from the WDI database (World Bank 2005). 
Note that in order to measure national resources allocated to education, current 
expenditure is preferred to the overall education budget because the latter may in some 
cases include the aid resources taken into account separately here.2 This problem can be 
 
2 In fact, UNESO-UIS questionnaires require the inclusion of aid resources into the national education 
budget. However, in practice, bilateral project aid cannot generally be expected to be included in these 
figures. In many cases, national education ministries were not even informed about the volumes 
concerned. Transparency improved when budget financing and the financing of sector programs were 
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avoided for current educational expenditure as – until recently – donors argued that 
regular payments were to be financed locally in order to ensure sustainability.  
Finally, four variables are introduced to assess the impact of good governance. 
Following Burnside and Dollar (2000, p. 851), relevant policies considered are the 
budget surplus in percent of GDP (BUDGET), the rate of inflation (INFLATION), and 
openness (OPEN) calculated as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. 
Based on these three variables, Burnside and Dollar create a policy index using weights 
specifically derived for growth regressions. As these weights are not applicable to 
education, this paper does not recur to the index but considers each variable separately. 
Again, all necessary data is provided by the WDI database (World Bank 2005). 
As the above variables merely refer to economic aspects of good governance, they are 
complemented by the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties (FREE) 
which covers the broader political and institutional environment. This index is based on 
the evaluation of: free elections, the real power of elected political representatives, the 
de facto power of the opposition, the right to organize in groups, freedom of domination 
by the military or other powerful groups, and self determination rights of minority 
groups (political rights), as well as freedom of expression and belief, association and 
organizational rights, rule of law and human rights, and personal autonomy and 
economic rights (civil liberties). The index is measured on a one-to-seven scale, with 
one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest (Freedom House 
2005). Alternative indices such as the more recent World Bank governance indicators 
computed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003, 2005) have also been considered, 
but have been finally rejected due to the limited length of available time series.3  
As the overall data set contains a considerable number of missing values, imputations 
were carried out for all explanatory variables. With the exception of FREE, these 
imputations were based on linear regression using related variables, i.e. their own lags 
as well as other macroeconomic indicators in the case of macroeconomic variables, and 
different types of aid data including information on related sectors such a health in the 
case of EDUCAID. When information was missing for the Freedom House Index, the 
observation was replaced by the highest (i.e. worst) value available over time for the 
country concerned. For all variables, missing value indicators were computed and 
integrated in the econometric estimation equations in order to avoid or reduce potential 
bias created by these imputations. 
 
introduced at the turn of the century. Nevertheless, according to information from UNESCO-UIS, even 
budget aid has not been consistently included into the national figures yet.   
3 For the data, see World Bank (2006). 
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Countries were included in the sample if they belonged (i) to the group of low- or lower 
middle income countries as defined by the World Bank (2003) as well as (ii) to the 
group of developing countries (Part I of DAC aid recipients) according to DAC 
statistics. The latter condition excludes several lower middle income countries, 
particularly in Eastern Europe. This selection is based on the idea that countries above a 
certain development threshold have generally reached universal primary education so 
that they are of no interest for the analysis in this paper. Overall, over 120 low- and 
lower middle income countries are covered by the following econometric analysis. 
Note that the data set deliberately ends in 2000 although some more recent data is 
available. The reason is that with the beginning of the 21st century, budget aid and 
sector program support have been introduced in many countries so that a distinction 
between aid resources and the recipient governments’ own spending on education has 
become blurred even with respect to current education expenditure which was 
traditionally fully left to the responsibility of local governments. 
 
3 Econometric analysis 
As there is strong evidence of an autocorrelation of educational outcomes both in terms 
of enrolment and completion, the econometric analysis is carried out using the GMM 
dynamic panel estimators suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). While Arellano and Bond (1991) use a first 
differenced estimator to avoid the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the 
individual effect included in the error term, Arellano and Bover (1995) reinclude levels 
equations in combination with suitable lags of first differenced variables as instruments. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrate that these additional levels restrictions remain 
informative even if the restrictions in first differences encounter the weak instruments 
problem discussed by Staiger and Stock (1997). Moreover, they show that adding the 
levels equations considerably increases the precision of the estimator, especially when 
the autocorrelation of the dependent variable is relatively high.  
At the same time, the overall number of instruments becomes disproportionally high in 
some regressions, sometimes higher than the number of countries included in the panel. 
Due to the additional levels restrictions, this problem arises more often with the 
Blundell-Bond than with the Arellano-Bond estimator. Roodman’s (2005) 
implementation of both estimators in Stata suggests an easy way to mitigate this 
problem through a limitation of the lags to be considered as instruments (collapse 
option). In our analysis, this option is used in some regressions in order to improve 
overall regression statistics, in particular the test for validity of the overidentifying 
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restrictions (Hansen test). Note that for both Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond 
estimation, one-step and two-step options are available. Arellano and Bond’s (1991) 
simulations suggest that the two-step option may increase the precision of coefficient 
estimates and considerably improve overall regression statistics in case of 
heteroscedasticity, but that standard errors tend to be systematically underestimated. 
This systematic bias is taken into account by the robust version of the estimators 
implemented by Roodman (2005) which include Windmeijer’s (2005) finite-sample 
correction for the two-step covariance matrix. 
An additional methodological issue is that EDUCAID cannot be realistically considered 
as an exogenous variable. It is highly plausible that exogenous shocks like droughts or 
earthquakes simultaneously influence aid inflows and development outcomes like 
educational enrolment and completion rates. For this reason, EDUCAID is instrumented 
in all regressions, generally using its own lag as an instrument.  
To some extent, one might expect the same argument to be true for national resources 
allocated to education (EXPEDUC). As we are measuring current expenditure flows 
which are, by definition, more stable than capital investment, the problem may be less 
relevant though. In any case, in order to check the robustness of our results, we will also 
instrument EXPEDUC by its lag in some regression specifications.  
Generally, the choice of a lagged explanatory variable as its own instrument has the 
advantage of a strong correlation with the initial variable. However, it is sometimes 
difficult to argue that it is truly uncorrelated with the error term, i.e. that it satisfies the 
second requirement for a valid instrumental variable (IV). In particular, a problem arises 
when the endogeneity of the original variable is caused by reverse causation, i.e. by an 
influence of the dependent variable on the regressor concerned. This may be an 
alternative reason for the endogeneity of EDUCAID as it is not implausible to assume 
that donors purposefully orient their educational aid resources towards recipient 
countries most in need of these resources, i.e. to countries with low net enrolment and 
completion rates. Obviously, if current aid is influenced by current educational 
outcomes, lagged aid is influenced by lagged educational outcomes. As in our case, 
educational outcomes are autocorrelated over time, lagged aid is indirectly also related 
to current educational outcomes, and hence to the error term of the current period.4  
To give due attention to the possibility of reverse causation, we spent considerable time 
to think of instruments for EDUCAID that would remain valid in this case. In order to 
 
4 Only under very specific assumptions about the relationship between the error term of the regression 
equation and the error term of the equation specifying the (reverse) effect of educational outcomes on 
aid, it is still possible to construct a situation in which the lagged EDUCAID is uncorrelated with the 
error term. 
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find alternative instruments, development assistance channeled to other sectors such as 
health, water and sanitation, infrastructure, industry, energy, agriculture and 
government/civil service was examined with respect to the criteria set out in Angrist, 
Imbens and Rubin (1996). Almost all of these variables are significantly correlated with 
educational aid, but there appears to be a certain trade-off between the strength of the 
correlation and the potential endogeneity of the instrument itself. The most extreme case 
is aid for health which is highly correlated with aid for education both across countries 
and across time. Partial R²s using the commitment data from the 1970s onwards and 
control variables as in the regressions discussed in the following section are: 27% 
(within), 59% (between) and 40% (overall).5 At the same time, it can be expected that 
outcomes in both sectors are similarly correlated. Generally unsatisfactory social sector 
development may enhance donor spending on health and education simultaneously. 
Therefore, using health as an instrumental variable may not solve the endogeneity 
problem. 
Moreover, aid for health might raise enrolment rates independently of aid for education 
as healthier children may have a higher likelihood to attend school. It is therefore 
inappropriate as an instrument for EDUCAID. 
An alternative instrument which can probably be considered as truly exogenous is 
energy aid. Energy aid comprises all assistance allocated to the production of energy, 
energy sector policy planning, institution building and distribution management. It does 
not include the extraction of raw materials for power generation (OECD/DAC 2004). 
Unfortunately, the correlation between energy aid and educational aid is much lower 
than in the case of health. While the cross-country correlation is acceptable, the 
correlation within countries over time is almost negligible. Partial R²s for the regression 
of EDUCAID on ENERGYAID and all other control variables as in the regression 
tables discussed below are: 3% (within), 31% (between) and 24% (overall).6 
Nevertheless, the relationship between EDUCAID and ENERGYAID is significant at 
the 1% level in this model. A graphical representation is provided in Figure 1.  
 
5 The computation of partial R²s here and elsewhere in this paper is based on the analysis suggested by 
Shea (1997). However, to adjust to the panel structure of the data, OLS regressions in each step were 
substituted by random effects regressions. Similarly, the final correlation of residuals (step 4, p. 349) was 
replaced by a bivariate random effects regression in order to derive partial R²s distinguishing between the 
correlations within and between countries. 
Note that the correlation tests were carried out before the EDUCAID variable was imputed so as to 
properly distinguish between the different sector variables. 
6 The exact figures refer to the case in which aid is measured as a percentage of GDP, i.e. they would 
exactly correspond to a first step equation for the model in Table 2, equation 5 if this model had not been 
estimated using the more complex system GMM estimation suggested by Blundel and Bond and 
described above. The partial R²s of analogous regressions for the corresponding equations in Table 1 
and 3 are somewhat lower, and ENERGYAID is less highly significant.
Figure 1: Energy aid as an instrument for educational aid 
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* Both EDUCAID and the instrumental variable (IV) are corrected for the influence of all other 
explanatory variables (as of Table 2, Regression 5).  
The graph shows that some positive relationship exists, but it is not very clear and 
blurred by several outliers. Shea (1997, pp. 348f.) notes that as long as the instruments 
are perfectly exogenous, coefficient estimates remain consistent, but their precision is 
reduced. However, as within each country only few time series observations are 
available, finite sample properties are more relevant here. Staiger and Stock (1997) 
emphasize the important bias which can arise if the relevance of the instruments is 
weak, and show that the endogeneity bias in the simple OLS regression might in some 
cases be lower. The above discussion shows that ENERGYAID belongs to these 
relatively weak instruments, in particular when we consider the within country 
relationship. Nevertheless, ENERGYAID appears to be the best instrument available 
and will be retained in the analysis for some regressions as an alternative to the lagged 
EDUCAID.  
The results of the different regressions will be discussed in two settings: a long term 
structural model (Section 3.1) and an annual model for the 1990s (Section 3.2). While 
the former is theoretically more appealing, the latter benefits from the availability of 
more reliable data.  
 
3.1 Results for the structural panel 
The basic idea of the structural panel is that educational outcomes such as enrolment 
will tend to react on long-term developments of resource availability, the education 
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system and the policy environment rather than on short-term variation of any of these 
variables. From this perspective, annual data create unnecessary noise which can be 
avoided if the data are smoothed over several years. For the purpose of this study, 
available information on all variables was simply averaged over the five-year periods 
1971-1975 until 1996-2000.  
For the early years, information on COMPLETION is extremely scarce, so that about 
two thirds of the data would have to be imputed. We therefore confine the analysis of 
the structural panel to the determinants of NER. Results are presented in Table 1 and 2. 
Both tables use identical models but differ with respect to the aid variable. As the effect 
of a given aid volume depends upon the size of the recipient country, examining the 
effect of aid flows in absolute numbers does not seem adequate. We propose two 
different ways to adjust these numbers to country size: 
(i) Education aid relative to the population of the recipient country 
(Table 1: EDUCAIDn), and 
(ii) Education aid in % of recipient countries’ GDP (Table 2: EDUCAIDg). 
While the former takes into account the number of people who effectively have to share 
the amount of aid received, the latter reflects the relevance of aid as compared to the 
recipient countries’ own resources.  
Tables 1 and 2 present five regressions each, using always the same set of explanatory 
variables but different estimation techniques. Regression (1) shows the simple Arellano-
Bond model, Regression (2) the Arellano-Bond model with Windmeijer’s robust 
variance-covariance matrix, and Regression (3) the robust Blundel-Bond estimation. In 
all of these, EDUCAID is instrumented using its own lag (L.EDUCAID) so that we 
have an additional restriction added to the moment restrictions of the original GMM 
estimator. Regressions 4 introduces lagged national current expenditure on education as 
an additional IV variable for EXPEDUC and Regression 5 uses ENERGYAID instead 
of L.EDUCAID to instrument for aid to education. 
Results are far from robust across these different regressions. EDUCAID, our main 
variable of interest, shows a significantly positive coefficient only in one regression 
(Regression (1), Table 1). Unfortunately, as discussed above, this specification is the 
least reliable with respect to significance levels. As soon as the structural bias of 
standard errors is taken into account using Windmeier’s robust variance-covariance 
matrix, no significant effect can be distinguished any more. Moreover, EDUCAID is 
insignificant all through in Table 2.  
Interestingly, there is no improvement with respect to the evidence for any significant 
impact of aid even in Regression (5) of both tables. If donors distributed aid for 
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education according to need, i.e. in response to low enrolment rates, we should expect 
the coefficients of Regression (1)-(4) to be biased downwards, but Regression (5) to 
show the true effect of aid. However, in Tables 1 and 2 the opposite happens: Rather 
than to increase and to become significant, the coefficient in fact turns negative. Thus 
there is no evidence that the missing link between aid resources and educational 
outcomes could be due to reverse causation. 
With respect to national current education expenditure, we do not find any more 
positive result, either. This variable is significantly positive only in one regression, too 
(Regression 3, Table 1), and only at the 10% level. We thus do not find any evidence for 
a greater effectiveness of national as compared to foreign resources. Such differences in 
effectiveness were found by some authors on the basis of country-case studies. Mercer 
et al. (2002), for instance, suggest that there may be a higher effectiveness of local 
resources due to general deficiencies in the management of aid resources, their missing 
focus on the relevant objective, and the overpricing of goods purchased by aid 
resources, especially if purchased in the donor, rather than in the recipient country. 
However, while this evidence certainly reflects the situation in some country-cases, the 
broader literature also shows the frequently inefficient use of government resources. 
Plotting national resources allocated to education against educational outcomes such as 
enrolment and even against quality related educational outcome variables in a cross-
country setting typically makes it difficult to observe any clear link between the 
resources spent and the outcomes achieved (see e.g. MINEDAF 2002, Figure 2.3; 
Michaelowa 2001, p. 1702).  
In this context, it should be noted, that teacher remuneration accounts for the bulk of 
education expenditure, and its part rises up to 90% in some African countries (World 
Bank 2003). At the same time, it can be expected to have a marked positive effect on 
enrolment only if it reflects the employment of a high number of teachers. However, 
much of the cross-country variation reflects differences in teacher salaries rather than 
differences in the number of teachers employed. This may explain why we do not find 
much evidence for a significant effect of national resources in our analysis either. 
As far as our other control variables with respect to the national education are 
concerned, the pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) is positive and strongly significant in all 
Arellano-Bond regressions. This effect is highly plausible in a situation of under-supply 
in which (at a given level of resources and their distribution) enrolment can only be 
increased by accepting more children within each class (see Mingat and Tan 2003, 
Mingat and Suchaut 2000, and MINEDAF 2002 for further discussion). Our Arellano-
Bond coefficient estimates imply that increasing the PTR by 10 students goes hand in 
hand with an increase of the net enrolment rate by 3-4 percentage points. At the same 
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time, we cannot observe this effect in our Blundel-Bond estimations where the 
coefficient turns negative although it remains insignificant except for Regression 5, 
Table 1, where it becomes marginally significant at the 10% level. 
Surprisingly, the share of children within the total population (YOUNG-POP) does not 
show any significant effect although one would expect that a higher share of school 
aged children puts additional strain on the education system. An explanation may be 
that the long run relationship may be blurred through a correlation of YOUNG-POP 
with other factors such as the development of infrastructure which are not taken into 
account here. In this case, we should observe a significant relationship in Section 3.2 
when we will discuss the results of the annual panel for the 1990s. 
 
Table 1: Results for the structural panel using EDUCAIDn 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable: NER 
 
Arellano&Bond 
 
IV: L.EDUCAIDn 
Arellano&Bond, 
robust 
IV: L.EDUCAIDn
Blundell&Bond, 
robust 
IV: L.EDUCAIDn
Blundell&Bond, 
robust 
 IV: L.EDUCAIDn 
      L.EXPEDUC 
Blundell&Bond, 
robust  
IV: ENERGYAID
L.NER 0.74*** 0.55** 0.39 0.57 0.24 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.165) (0.171) (0.359) 
EDUCAIDn 0.15** 0.01 0.12 0.08 -0.23 
commitments (0.019) (0.909) (0.371) (0.539) (0.308) 
EXPEDUC 0.13 -0.73 2.07* 5.30 1.04 
 (0.934) (0.629) (0.071) (0.688) (0.523) 
PTR 0.30** 0.44*** -0.24 -0.11 -0.27* 
 (0.018) (0.000) (0.205) (0.637) (0.093) 
YOUNG-POP -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07 
 (0.979) (0.855) (0.896) (0.884) (0.489) 
GDPcap 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.002 0.003** 
 (0.486) (0.378) (0.043) (0.278) (0.013) 
BUDGET -0.26** -0.18 -0.07 -0.11 -0.01 
 (0.028) (0.132) (0.582) (0.554) (0.955) 
INFLATION 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.220) (0.693) (0.726) (0.904) (0.768) 
OPEN -2.08 -0.47 -1.23 -4.78 0.83 
 (0.221) (0.769) (0.329) (0.732) (0.620) 
FREE 0.06 -0.66 -0.89 -0.85* -1.71*** 
 (0.936) (0.323) (0.107) (0.069) (0.003) 
Wald chi2(18)=7878.3 
(0.000) 
chi2(18)=203.4 
(0.000) 
chi2(18)=531.21 
(0.000) 
chi2(18)=1940.5 
(0.000) 
chi2(17)=247.47 
(0.000) 
Hansen chi2(6) = 8.60 
(0.197) 
chi2(18) = 17.04 
(0.520) 
chi2(8) = 6.84 
(0.554) 
chi2(12) = 10.22 
(0.597) 
chi2(4) = 1.17 
(0.883) 
AR1 z = -2.28 
(0.022) 
z = -1.88 
(0.060) 
z = -1.77 
(0.076) 
z = -1.74 
(0.081) 
z = -2.24 
(0.025) 
AR2 z = 1.02 
(0.307) 
z = 1.21  
(0.225) 
z = 1.03  
(0.304) 
z = 1.05 
(0.292) 
z = 1.25 
(0.213) 
N 382 382 520 520 442 
Countries 122 122 129 129 124 
P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The prefix L. denotes a lagged variable. 
Constant term and missing value indicators not presented here. 
For an overview of variable definitions and sources, see Annex 1. 
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Table 2: Results for the structural panel using EDUCAIDg 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable: NER 
 
Arellano&Bond 
 
IV: L.EDUCAIDg 
Arellano&Bond, 
robust 
IV: L.EDUCAIDg
Blundell&Bond, 
robust 
IV: L.EDUCAIDg
Blundell&Bond, 
robust 
 IV: L.EDUCAIDg 
      L.EXPEDUC 
Blundell&Bond, 
robust  
IV: ENERGYAID
L.NER 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.80** 0.72* 0.41 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.031) (0.055) (0.396) 
EDUCAIDg 
commitments 
0.16 
(0.405) 
0.16 
(0.738) 
0.52 
(0.654) 
0.50 
(0.605) 
-2.89 
(0.116) 
EXPEDUC -0.33 -0.33 0.63 3.55 -0.86 
 (0.819) (0.834) (0.673) (0.773) (0.643) 
PTR 0.36*** 0.36** -0.01 -0.03 -0.15 
 (0.007) (0.039) (0.945) (0.883) (0.569) 
YOUNG-POP 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 
 (0.724) (0.805) (0.711) (0.967) (0.878) 
GDPcap 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.135) (0.237) (0.280) (0.221) (0.364) 
BUDGET -0.22** -0.22* -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 
 (0.021) (0.090) (0.677) (0.664) (0.856) 
INFLATION 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.630) (0.771) (0.287) (0.811) (0.883) 
OPEN -1.68 -1.68 -1.10 -3.58 2.05 
 (0.229) (0.303) (0.540) (0.780) (0.300) 
FREE -0.12 -0.12 -0.15 -0.62 -1.49 
 (0.831) (0.876) (0.829) (0.178) (0.158) 
Wald chi2(17)=846.38 
(0.000) 
chi2(17)=579.71 
(0.000) 
chi2(17)=398.88 
0.000) 
chi2(17)=1000.6 
(0.000) 
chi2(16)=309.68 
(0.000) 
Hansen  chi2(18) = 19.90 
(0.338) 
chi2(18) = 19.90 
(0.338) 
chi2(8) = 7.99 
(0.434) 
chi2(12) = 13.03 
(0.367) 
chi2(4) = 0.54 
(0.969) 
AR1 z = -2.08 
(0.037) 
z = -1.85 
(0.064) 
z =  -1.99 
(0.047) 
z =  -2.07 
(0.038) 
z = -1.77 
(0.076) 
AR2 z = 1.20  
(0.229) 
z = 1.19   
(0.235) 
z = 1.22  
(0.222) 
z = 1.13  
(0.259) 
z = 1.22  
(0.221) 
N 359 359 492 492 429 
Countries 118 118 124 124 121 
P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The prefix L. denotes a lagged variable. 
Constant term and missing value indicators not presented here. 
For an overview of variable definitions and sources, see Annex 1. 
The control variable for the general income level shows the expected positive 
coefficients. The effect remains moderate, however, as educational expenditure is 
already controlled for, and is significant only in specifications (3) and (5) of Table 1.  
Finally considering the governance variables leads to a more interesting result. None of 
the variables related to economic aspects of good governance appear to be positively 
related to education outcomes. Inflation (INFLATION) and openness (OPEN) are 
insignificant throughout and a budget surplus (BUDGET) has a negative rather than a 
positive effect, if at all. Possibly, this reflects that budgetary austerity might go hand in 
hand with cuts in national educational investment which is not taken into account 
elsewhere in the regression if it is not financed by aid. But the result with respect to 
BUDGET is not very convincing as it is clearly significant only in Regression (1) of 
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both tables, and this regression suffers from a downward biased standard errors as 
explained above. 
However, as opposed to the economic variables, the political and institutional aspects 
captured by the Freedom House index (FREE) do show some relationship between good 
governance and student enrolment, at least in the (rather more reliable) robust Blundell-
Bond regressions. Coefficients are significant in Regressions (4) and (5) of Table 1, and 
close to significant in Regression (3). According to the corresponding coefficient 
estimates, a one-point increase on the seven-point scale towards oppression goes hand 
in hand with a reduction of primary enrolment rates by 0.9-1.7 percentage points.  
This shows that the role of institutional factors frequently demonstrated in a more 
general context of development (see e.g. Rodrik, Subramaniam and Trebbi 2002; World 
Bank 2001) also appears to be somewhat relevant for the specific sector of education. 
At the same time, the relevance of economic as opposed to political governance seems 
to be limited to economic development measured by variables such as growth. 
Overall, the regression results for the structural panel appear plausible, though not very 
stable when changing the estimation techniques applied. While there are certain 
advantages of the Blundel-Bond system GMM as compared to the Arellano-Bond 
estimator, and a clear underestimation problem of standard errors in the non-robust 
specification of the latter, any further judgment about the reliability of the different 
regressions is difficult to establish. Overall regression statistics are equally acceptable 
for all equations. At the 10% level, the null of no 2nd order autocorrelation of the 
differenced residuals (AR2) cannot be rejected, while it is rejected for 1st order 
autocorrelation (AR1). This reflects the structure of the differenced model in which the 
(differenced) residuals must be correlated of order 1 except for the case in which the 
errors in levels follow a random walk, while any further autocorrelation would imply 
that the GMM estimators are inconsistent. Moreover, based on the Hansen test, the 
validity of overidentifying restrictions is clearly accepted throughout. The Wald test 
indicates a good general fit of all regressions. Note, however, that there is a 
considerable variation of the number of observations available for the different 
regressions. By construction, Arellano-Bond estimation loses the observations for one 
full 5-year term as the estimation takes place in first differences. Moreover, within the 
Blundell-Bond regressions, the use of energy aid as an instrument for EDUCAID leads 
to the loss of a considerable number of observations due to missing data for the 
instrument, which cannot be imputed using other forms of aid given the risk of a 
correlation with the error term. Some of the differences in regression results may thus 
not be induced by variations of the estimation technique, but simply by changes in the 
database. 
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3.2 Results for the annual panel 
To complement our analysis by the estimation of a short term relationship, we can now 
turn to an annual database for the 1990s which is more complete and reliable, both with 
respect to educational outcomes and with respect to aid to EDUCAID. Only information 
for ENERGYAID is still very limited. 
For educational outcomes, we can now use either the NER or the completion rates 
(COMPLETION), and for EDUCAID we can use either disbursements or technical 
cooperation. Adding the remaining choice between EDUCAIDg and EDUCAIDn, we 
have eight different options for each regression. To simplify the presentation, we limit 
the rest of the analysis to EDUCAIDg because the corresponding point estimates are 
easier to interpret and to compare with the values of the coefficient for EXPEDUC 
which is expressed as a percentage of GNI. Moreover, Table 3 only displays the results 
for regressions using COMPLETION and disbursements (with regression specifications 
as in Tables 1 and 2) while Table 4 shows all other possible combinations of aid and 
educational outcome variables using a single (preferred) estimation technique. 
In the setting of Table 3, EDUCAID turns out to be positive and significant throughout, 
except for the regression in which it is instrumented by ENERGYAID. Coefficients are 
always higher than those for current national education expenditure, and the latter are 
not significant in any of the five regressions. The highest point estimates for the 
coefficient of EDUCAID in those regressions in which it is significant is 2.5 
(Regression (4)), which indicates that an increase in aid for education by 1% of GDP 
implies an increase in primary completion rates by 2.5 percentage points. 
The control variables for the context of the national education system PTR and 
YOUNG-POP are now consistently significant as well (except for Regression 2 in the 
case of the PTR). The share of the population under 15 years of age shows the expected 
negative impact on the capacity of the education system to accommodate all children, an 
effect for which the evidence was lacking in the structural panel discussed earlier. As 
opposed to the structural panel, the effect of the PTR is now negative throughout. This 
may indicate that in the short run, demand-side effects dominate over supply-side 
restrictions. Thus the negative coefficient can be interpreted as an indication that parents 
do not send their children to school (or take them out again rather early) if class size is 
so big that they do not expect much positive result from the children’s attendance. 
GDP per capita does not appear to be relevant in the short run, once all the other 
variables are controlled for. It is significant only in Regression (1) where standard errors 
are known to be biased. 
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Table 3: Results for the annual panel using EDUCAIDg/disbursements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variable: NER 
 
Arellano&Bond 
 
IV: L.EDUCAIDg 
Arellano&Bond, 
robust 
IV: L.EDUCAIDg
Blundell&Bond, 
robust 
IV: L.EDUCAIDg
Blundell&Bond, 
robust 
 IV: L.EDUCAIDg 
      L.EXPEDUC 
Blundell&Bond, 
robust  
IV: ENERGYAID
L.COMPLETION -0.07*** -0.07 0.12 0.16 0.04 
 (0.000) (0.379) (0.329) (0.138) (0.805) 
EDUCAIDg 
disbursements 
0.83*** 
(0.000) 
0.83* 
(0.069) 
2.22** 
(0.041) 
2.53** 
(0.021) 
31.37 
(0.151) 
EXPEDUC 0.29 0.29 0.68 2.13 2.04 
 (0.279) (0.799) (0.828) (0.588) (0.637) 
PTR -0.07*** -0.07 -0.68*** -0.64*** -0.69*** 
 (0.003) (0.561) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
POP -2.19*** -2.19*** -1.08*** -1.07*** -1.63*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDPcap -0.003*** -0.003 0.000 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.309) (0.915) (0.977) (0.202) 
BUDGET 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.08 0.22 
 (0.259) (0.772) (0.884) (0.577) (0.435) 
INFLATION 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.003** 
 (0.639) (0.837) (0.690) (0.670) (0.030) 
OPEN 0.32 0.32 1.55 -0.07 0.89 
 (0.140) (0.417) (0.611) (0.985) (0.838) 
FREE -1.05*** -1.05 -0.87 -0.41 0.81 
 (0.000) (0.252) (0.208) (0.511) (0.497) 
Wald  chi2(19)=41455 
(0.000) 
chi2(19)=49.93 
(0.000) 
chi2(19)=253.52 
(0.000) 
chi2(19)=293.79 
(0.000) 
chi2(18)=2744 
(0.000) 
Hansen chi2(88) = 87.08 
(0.508) 
chi2(88) = 87.08 
(0.508) 
chi2(18) = 28.23 
(0.059) 
chi2(27) = 34.77 
(0.145) 
chi2(9) =  11.99 
(0.214) 
AR1 z = -4.13 
(0.000) 
z = -3.20 
(0.001) 
z = -3.63 
(0.000) 
z = -3.89 
(0.000) 
z = -2.74 
(0.006) 
AR2 z = 0.09 
(0.925) 
z = 0.08 
(0.940) 
z = 1.35 
(0.177) 
z = 1.58 
(0.114) 
z = -0.30 
(0.763) 
N 822 822 999 999 664 
Countries 124 124 128 128 112 
P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The prefix L. denotes a lagged variable. 
Constant term and missing value indicators not presented here. 
For an overview of variable definitions and sources, see Annex 1. 
With respect to the economic governance indicators, estimation results are similar to 
those of the structural panel. Again, no significant and positive relationship between 
good economic governance and educational outcomes can be found.  
The only variable which is significant in at least one regression is INFLATION 
(Regression 5), but again the coefficient indicates the opposite of what would typically 
be expected as an effect of good governance, as inflation seems to be positively rather 
than negatively related to primary completion. If at all this effect can be taken 
seriously7, it might have to be interpreted in relation to teacher salaries. As mentioned 
                                                 
7 It may also simply be a reflection of the fact that, by definition, at a significance level of 10%, the 
coefficient estimate must be expected to appear significantly different from 0, even if it is not, in 1 out 
of 10 regressions. 
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in the previous section, the latter make up for the bulk of current educational 
expenditure and increased enrolment and completion are very difficult to achieve under 
conditions of relatively high salaries (Mingat, Rakotomalala and Tan 2002). At the same 
time nominal teacher salaries, just as the salaries of any civil servants, have been 
relatively sticky, at least until the late 1990s. From that perspective, inflation may have 
reduced the financing needs of the education system through an effective reduction of 
real salaries. 
In any case, this effect, if any, has nothing to do with a potential effect of good 
economic governance. At the same time, as opposed to Tables 1 and 2, evidence for a 
positive impact of good political governance is not convincing either in Table 3. 
Overall regression statistics are again generally acceptable although in Regression (3), 
the validity of overidentifying restrictions can only be accepted if the significance level 
is reduced to 5%. Despite this problem, we select this regression for further analysis 
with varying combinations of educational outcome and aid variables. The reasons for 
this choice are the following:  
(i) As explained above, Blundell-Bond estimation is generally preferable to the 
original Arellano-Bond estimation. 
(ii) Among the Blundell-Bond regressions, the additional instrumentation of 
EXPEDUC in Regression (4) does not change much of the results, both with 
respect to the regression coefficients of the significant variables and with 
respect to overall regression statistics. While the Hansen test slightly 
improves, the AR2 test is rather close to rejecting the hypothesis of no 2nd 
order serial correlation. Using L.EXPEDUC as an IV thus does not seem to 
lead to an improvement of the initial specification. 
(iii) The replacement of L.EDUCAID by ENERGYAID as an IV for EDUCAID 
in Regression (5) does lead to some improvement of the overall regression 
statistics. However, the number of observations decreases by 1/3 due to the 
missing value problem with respect to ENERGYAID already discussed 
above. Taking together the evidence from the structural and the annual panel 
presented so far, results for Regression (5) often diverge from results of the 
other regressions, but not in the sense expected if there were reverse 
causation which the IV approach would take care of. There rather seems to 
be some risk that the results of Regression (5) are suffer from sample 
selection bias induced by a non random selection of observations into the 
model when all the missings for ENERGYAID cannot be considered. 
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(iv) Finally, as compared to most of the other regressions, Regression (3) shows 
a relatively high and significant impact of EDUCAID. In case of doubt, we 
tend to select those specifications which are more favorable for a positive 
impact of aid. By doing so, we attempt to ensure that our final results 
indicate the most optimistic, rather than the most pessimistic results for the 
effect of aid on educational outcomes. 
Table 4 therefore takes Regression (3) from Table 3 as a basis. We first keep 
COMPLETION as the dependent variable and replace only the disbursements by 
technical cooperation for EDUCAID (Regression (1)). We then show the results for 
disbursements, but with NER instead of COMPLETION as the dependent variable 
(Regression (2)). Finally, in Regression (3), technical cooperation is combined with 
NER as the dependent variable. 
Neither the relationship between technical cooperation and primary completion rates, 
nor the relationship between disbursements and net enrolment rates turn out to be 
significant. Coefficient estimates even turn negative. However, Regression (3) which 
estimates the effect of technical cooperation in the education sector on primary net 
enrolment shows a positive and significant impact of 0.9 percentage points induced by 
an increase in aid by 1% of GDP. Similarly, current national expenditure is insignificant 
in Regressions (1) and (2), but significant with a strong positive effect in Regression (3). 
In fact, in this particular specification, the effect of EXPEDUC is extremely strong and 
about 11 times higher than the effect of technical cooperation. 
All other results are similar as before. We again find a negative effect of a high pupil-
teacher ratio and of a high share of children within the population. The negative effect 
of bad political governance which had been less obvious in Table 3 is again found here 
and significant at the 10% level in two out of three regressions. Among our variables for 
economic governance, now openness to trade shows the only significant effect (in one 
regression), but again, the negative coefficient estimate contradicts rather than confirms 
any positive effect of good economic governance.  
It should be noted that overall regression statistics tend to be less convincing for this 
table, than in the other regression tables discussed before. 
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Table 4: Alternative education and aid variables  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Blundell&Bond, robust 
IV: L.EDUCAIDg 
Dep.var.: COMPLETION 
 
Dep. var.: NER  Dep. Var.: NER 
L.COMPLETION 0.14   
 (0.257)   
L.NER  0.21 0.22 
  (0.258) (0.360) 
EDUCAIDg  
technical coop. 
-0.54 
(0.272) 
 0.90** 
(0.015) 
EDUCAIDg 
disbursements 
 -1.11 
(0.209) 
 
EXPEDUC -0.47 1.26 10.36** 
 (0.804) (0.345) (0.015) 
PTR -0.68*** -0.31** -0.25 
 (0.000) (0.030) (0.180) 
POP -1.02*** -0.68*** -0.90*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) 
GDPcap -0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.630) (0.423) (0.642) 
BUDGET -0.00 0.17 0.08 
 (0.980) (0.185) (0.570) 
INFLATION -0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.488) (0.629) (0.665) 
OPEN 2.68 0.65 -8.91** 
 (0.146) (0.588) (0.032) 
FREE -1.14* -0.86* -1.07 
 (0.099) (0.073) (0.144) 
Wald chi2(19)=278.46 
(0.000) 
chi2(19)=178.42 
(0.000) 
chi2(18)=2634.56 
(0.000) 
Hansen chi2(18) = 28.41 
(0.056) 
chi2(18) = 26.06 
(0.098) 
chi2(19) = 19.79 
(0.407) 
AR1 z = -3.58   
(0.000) 
z = -2.55  
(0.011) 
z = -1.89  
(0.059) 
AR2 z = 1.45   
(0.148) 
z = 1.50   
(0.133) 
z = 1.61  
(0.108) 
N 999 999 697 
Countries 128 128 113 
P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The prefix L. denotes a lagged variable. 
Constant term and missing value indicators not presented here. 
For an overview of variable definitions and sources, see Annex 1. 
Comparing the results of the structural panel with the results of the annual panel for the 
1990s, we do not observe major changes with respect to the effect of most of the 
explanatory variables. While it was expected that due to their limited change over time, 
especially the macroeconomic and governance variables, but also variables 
characterizing the education system would not reveal much impact in the annual panel, 
we actually observe that those which appear relevant in one case, also appear relevant in 
the other case.  
However, we observe that overall, the annual panel appears to show a much more 
convincing effect of aid. In those regressions in which it is significant, it is estimated to 
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lie at a gain in enrolment or completion by between 0.8 and 2.5 percentage points for an 
increase of aid by 1% of the GDP in recipient countries. However, looking at resources 
currently allocated to aid for education, this effect appears only very small. On average 
during the 1990s and across the countries considered here, aid to education as a share of 
GDP was 0.3% for disbursements and 0.5% for technical cooperation.8 Therefore, in 
the most optimistic case, to reach an aid induced increase in primary completion rates 
by 2.5 percentage points, we would need to increase aid allocated to education by 
200%. Thus, neither in our structural analysis since the early 1970s, nor in our annual 
analysis for the 1990s, aid appears to be a strongly relevant determinant of educational 
outcomes. Moreover, there is no clear evidence with respect to the effectiveness of aid 
as compared to the effectiveness of current national education expenditure.  
However, so far, we have not considered non-linearities and potential interaction 
effects. This may lead to a bias of our previous results and will be considered in detail in 
the following section. 
 
3.3 Testing for non-linearities and the possible interaction of aid and governance 
Non-linearities could be imagined with some plausibility for most of the explanatory 
variables in the regression. The wider aid effectiveness literature shows some strong 
evidence for decreasing returns of aid (see e.g. Hansen and Tarp 2001), and decreasing 
returns seem plausible as well for GDP per capita and the different variables introduced 
to measure good governance. It might well be that some of the potentially relevant 
relationships have been underestimated or not even been discovered yet because of the 
limitations of the linear model.  
Moreover, as Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) seminal paper on aid effectiveness suggests 
that aid may have a relevant impact only under conditions of good governance, the 
interaction between aid and governance will also be examined here. Possibly, our initial 
results on aid effectiveness in the education sector are underestimated because this 
interaction is not taken into account. Moreover, even if the average effect remains small, 
the effect of aid could be very high in a suitable political and economic environment. 
Hansen and Tarp’s (2001) critique of the Burnside and Dollar (2000) results on aid 
effectiveness shows that the issue of interaction terms and non-linearities of individual 
variables should not be treated separately. According to Hansen and Tarp, the relevance 
 
8 Calculated on the basis of the imputed dataset. Note that the higher percentage for technical cooperation 
may be explained either by the fact that information on this variable is more complete or by the 
(partial) inclusion of commitments which may not always have lead to actual disbursements (see 
Section 2). 
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of the interaction term between aid and governance in the Burnside-Dollar model is 
simply a reflection of decreasing returns to aid, or, put differently, to an omitted 
variable bias due to the omission of a relevant quadratic term. 
In this study, in order ensure that potential non-linearities are taken into account, each 
structural or political variable, including aid to education, is inserted into the model as a 
quadratic function. To avoid overloading the model with too many variables, this 
procedure is repeated one by one for each variable separately, whereby the quadratic 
term is retained in the overall model only if significant. In a second step, following the 
same procedure, each of the governance variables is inserted into the model with an 
interaction term with educational aid and retained in the model if significant. This 
procedure is carried out based on the annual panel for the 1990s and for all 
combinations of COMPLETION and NER with disbursements and technical 
cooperation. The base equation to which the quadratic and interaction terms are added is 
again Regression (3) from Table 3, i.e. the same regression underlying Table 4. 
As presented in Table 5, we find some evidence for both, decreasing returns of aid and 
an interaction between aid and good governance, albeit the former is statistically 
significant only when aid is expressed in terms of disbursements and educational 
outcomes in terms of NER (Regressions (2) and (7)) while the latter is significant only 
when aid is expressed in terms of technical cooperation (Regressions (3), (4) and (6)). 
While the relevance of the interaction term was tested for all governance variables (not 
shown), the only significant effect was found with respect to political governance 
expressed in terms of the Freedom House Index. FREE by itself then turns insignificant 
(although it remains close to significant in Regression (5)). 
Note that the first four regressions of Table 5 all use the same explanatory variables and 
only differ with respect to the use of COMPLETION or NER for educational outcomes, 
and disbursements or technical cooperation for EDUCAIDg. They all include both a 
square term for EDUCAIDg and the interaction term between FREE and EDUCAIDg. 
Regressions (5) and (6) additionally introduce a square term for FREE into the two 
regressions using technical cooperation, in which the interaction effect with FREE was 
significant. This leads to some reduction of the estimated strength of the relationship, 
but the latter remains significant at the 10% level, at least in Regression (6). 
Regression (7) finally omits the interaction term from the equations based on 
disbursements and NER, in which only the quadratic impact of aid was significant. This 
change does not alter the evidence for decreasing returns of aid. 
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Table 5: Diminishing returns and the interaction of aid and political governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Blundell&Bond, 
robust 
IV:L.EDUCAIDg 
Dep.var.: 
COMPLETION 
 
Dep. var.: 
NER 
Dep. Var.: 
COMPLETION
Dep. var.: 
NER 
Dep. Var.: 
COMPLETION 
Dep. var.: 
NER 
Dep. var.: 
NER 
L.COMPLETION 0.11 
(0.378) 
 0.21** 
(0.029) 
 0.20** 
(0.041) 
  
L.NER  0.29*  0.31**  0.30** 0.30* 
  (0.098)  (0.029)  (0.044) (0.088) 
EDUCAIDg 
disbursements 
9.31 
(0.142) 
8.13*** 
(0.005) 
    6.24** 
(0.016) 
EDUCAIDg² 
disbursements 
-0.50 
(0.273) 
-0.70*** 
(0.003) 
    -0.67** 
(0.011) 
Disbursements 
× FREE 
-2.71 
(0.164) 
-1.36 
(0.166) 
     
EDUCAIDg 
technical coop.  
  4.46 
(0.134) 
4.34* 
(0.087) 
2.95 
(0.319) 
3.62 
(0.138) 
 
EDUCAIDg² 
technical coop. 
  -0.18 
(0.236) 
-0.16 
(0.222) 
-0.12 
(0.436) 
-0.13 
(0.301) 
 
Technical coop.   -1,02* -0.84** -0.70 -0.69*  
× FREE   (0.075) (0.043) (0.194) (0.075)  
EXPEDUC 0.17 -0.05 -0.18 0.24 -0.36 0.28 0.26 
 (0.962) (0.971) (0.944) (0.886) (0.889) (0.868) (0.837) 
PTR -0.70*** -0.26* -0.64*** -0.20* -0.64*** -0.22* -0.29** 
 (0.000) (0.064) (0.000) (0.081) (0.000) (0.074) (0.039) 
POP -1.07*** -0.60*** -0.91*** -0.68*** -0.91*** -0.64*** -0.58** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.007) (0.012) 
GDPcap 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.713) (0.316) (0.988) (0.467) (0.695) (0.661) (0.323) 
BUDGET 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.09 
 (0.977) (0.678) (0.895) (0.725) (0.865) (0.883) (0.484) 
INFLATION -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.719) (0.405) (0.521) (0.494) (0.437) (0.604) (0.490) 
OPEN 1.89 1.93 2.07 1.54 2.25 1.50 1.68 
 (0.596) (0.092)* (0.395) (0.391) (0.397) (0.410) (0.128) 
FREE -0.35 -0.54 -0.55 -0.51 -5.21 -3.25 -0.50 
 (0.626) (0.320) (0.400) (0.387) (0.107) (0.167) (0.365) 
FREE²     0.54 0.32  
     (0.149) (0.257)  
Wald  chi2(21)= 
283.03 
(0.000) 
chi2(21)=
228.94 
(0.000) 
chi2(21)= 
397.42 
(0.000) 
chi2(21)=
364.84 
(0.000) 
chi2(22)= 
398.09 
(0.000) 
chi2(22)=
364.59 
(0.000) 
chi2(20)=
247.35 
(0.000) 
Hansen chi2(26) = 
36.12    
(0.089) 
chi2(36) =  
41.68    
(0.238) 
chi2(36) = 
41.42    
(0.246) 
chi2(36) =  
45.02    
(0.144) 
chi2(36) = 
40.46    
(0.280) 
chi2(36) =  
45.76    
(0.128) 
chi2(27) = 
38.39    
(0.072) 
AR1 z = -3.46 
(0.001) 
z = -2.93 
(0.003) 
z = -3.93 
(0.000) 
z = -3.19 
(0.001) 
z = -3.85 
(0.000) 
z = -3.10 
(0.002) 
z = -2.98 
(0.003) 
AR2 z = 1.14 
(0.256) 
z = 1.54 
(0.124) 
z = 1.69 
(0.091) 
z = 1.47 
(0.142) 
z = 1.65 
(0.099) 
z = 1.54 
(0.124) 
z = 1.58 
(0.115) 
N 999 999 999 999 999 999 999 
Countries 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The prefix L. denotes a lagged variable. 
Constant term and missing value indicators not presented here. 
For an overview of variable definitions and sources, see Annex 1. 
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Let us now more closely examine the coefficient estimates. The evidence on 
diminishing returns from Regression (7) suggests that the quadratic aid function has its 
maximum at about 5% of a recipient country’s GDP. This implies that the effect of 
higher disbursements gradually decreases up to this point and then turns negative. 5% is 
more than 10-times higher than average disbursements, but still exceeds the actual 
amount in some individual country-cases so that its effect is rather questionable. In 
those countries which receive relatively little aid, however, the added value of an 
increase of aid resources may be marked. According to Regression (7) the effect for 
countries with initial aid to education of between 0.1 and 0.5% of national GDP is more 
than twice as high as estimated in the most optimistic results from Tables 3 and 4. 
In all other regression models of Table 5, the effect of aid cannot be determined 
independently of the recipient country’s political environment. This variable also 
influences the threshold after which increasing aid has a negative impact. Computing 
the maximum amount of aid with a positive effect from Regression (4) where both 
EDUCAIDg by itself and the interaction term with FREE are significant we obtain 10% 
of GDP for a country with an ideal situation of political rights and civil liberties 
(FREE=1), but only 0.4% (i.e. close to the current average) for a country with a rather 
difficult situation (FREE=5). For countries with an even worse situation (FREE=6 or 7) 
any positive amount of aid to education appears to have a negative, rather than a 
positive effect on educational outcomes. These results suggest that aid resources may 
indeed be fungible, so that under adverse external circumstances, even if they are 
directly allocated to a specific purpose like education, they may indirectly fuel other 
activities harmful to development. In the other two regressions in which the interaction 
term is significant, the influence of political freedom on the impact of aid is of similar 
(Regression (6)) or even greater magnitude (Regression (3)). In the latter, only up to a 
situation of moderate political freedom (FREE=4) aid to education can exert any 
positive effect, while the effect is unambiguously negative in all situations in which 
oppression is stronger (FREE≥5). Table 6 presents an overview over the simulation 
results based on Regression (3) with varying degrees of political freedom and initial aid. 
It follows that under very positive political conditions, aid to education in the relevant 
range always has a positive effect while its effect is always negative under situations of 
extreme oppression. In between, i.e. in the ranges of FREE from 3 to 4, the effect of aid 
turns negative if aid is relatively high.  
 
Table 6: Simulations of the impact of aid to education at different levels of political  
               freedom and aid  
Freedom House index (FREE) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
7 
 
 25
EDUCAIDg (technical coop.)        
decreasing political freedom 
0.1% of GDP 3.40 2.38 1.36 0.34 -0.68 -1.70 -2.72 
0.5% of GDP 3.26 2.24 1.22 0.20 -0.82 -1.84 -2.86 
1% of GDP 3.08 2.06 1.04 0.02 -1.00 -2.02 -3.04 
2% of GDP 2.72 1.70 0.68 -0.34 -1.36 -2.38 -3.40 
5% of GDP 1.64 0.62 -0.40 -1.42 -2.44 -3.46 -4.48 
Numbers indicate the partial derivative ∂COMPLETION/∂EDUCAIDg for different initial values of 
EDUCAIDg and FREE based on coefficient estimates from Regression (3), Table 5. 
The above discussion provides a more refined picture of the impact of aid. However, 
overall, the effect of aid still seems to be very moderate. While the evidence on the 
diminishing returns of disbursements indicated that in cases of little initial aid, the 
impact of additional aid could be about twice as high as expected from the previous 
section, results for the interaction with political rights and civil liberties appear to be 
relatively close to the initial results, even for the best initial situations. Obviously, some 
of this result may be due to the low quality of the data at hand. As mentioned earlier, 
information on disbursements is far from complete while information on technical 
cooperation covers only parts of donor activity and does not clearly distinguish between 
disbursements and commitments. These problems may lead to downward biased 
coefficient estimates. However, it may also be that aid to education is not effectively 
oriented towards the central objective of universal primary education. This may be 
reflected in major parts of EDUCAID being oriented towards secondary and tertiary, 
rather than primary education. Specific data for development assistance allocated to 
primary education is available only for commitments and only after 1975 (and with 
many missing values).9 As far as information is available, we find that its share is 
indeed rather small: On average, it is 44% of total aid to education for the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, and about 35% thereafter (OECD/DAC 2004). Especially after 1990, 
when the EFA-objectives had been internationally declared in Jomptien, one might have 
expected a stronger orientation towards primary education. However, it seems that the 
share has in fact been decreasing relative to earlier years. 
 
                                                 
9 The DAC statistics include some inconsistent data with figures for aid to primary education higher than 
total aid to education. To calculate the above means, these values were adjusted to the maximum 
possible share of 100%. Without this adjustment, the means would appear substantially higher. 
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4 Conclusions 
Analyzing aid effectiveness at the sectoral level provides some interesting evidence 
both with respect to the general debate on aid effectiveness and with respect to the 
interaction between aid and governance. Despite some differences in the results based 
on different data and estimation methods, the empirical application to the education 
sector provides allows us to conclude that aid to education increases primary education 
in developing countries (measured both in terms of enrolment and completion rates). 
We thus indeed observe a positive effect of aid at the sector level. 
At the same time, coefficient estimates for the impact of aid are rather small. In the most 
optimistic case, they imply that an increase of the current aid by 200% would lead to a 
rise of net primary enrolment by 2.5 percentage points. Only where aid to education is 
relatively low at the outset, there may initially be a higher impact (about twice as high). 
All in all, this result demonstrates that, at any realistic rate of growth of aid to 
education, universal primary education will not be reached by this means. This holds at 
least as long as development assistance is not spent much more efficiently than it 
currently is. In fact, strikingly, despite the fact that universal primary education has been 
made a central international objective repeated over and over again on international 
conferences on poverty and on education, the average share of donors’ aid to education 
effectively committed to primary education has only been about 1/3 in recent years. 
Unfortunately, there is no compelling evidence that national education expenditure in 
developing countries shows any greater impact on education outcomes. Only in one 
regression specification, we obtain a rather high positive and significant coefficient 
implying that an increase of current education expenditure by 1% of GNI leads to a rise 
in net primary enrolment by 10%. Generally, coefficient estimates are much lower and 
insignificant. This confirms parts of the educational development literature which 
suggests that inefficiencies in national education expenditure are so important that 
results are only loosely related to financial inputs, at least in a cross-country 
comparison. 
Moreover, it comes out rather clearly that the structural parameters of the education 
system such as the number of young people in the country and the pupil-teacher ratio 
also play a crucial role when it comes to finding sustainable solutions for the financing 
of primary education. In the long run, countries in which population growth is high 
apparently have to accept equally high pupil-teacher ratios to achieve education for all. 
In the short run, however, high pupil-teacher ratios may reduce the demand for 
education. 
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Finally, the study suggests that national policies do not matter in the education sector 
alone. While good governance in economic terms (trade openness, budgetary austerity, 
price stability) does not show any significant positive effect on primary education 
enrolment, general political and institutional governance clearly does. Lack of political 
freedom and civil liberties is quite consistently negatively related to enrolment.  
In addition, at least in the short run, the effects of development assistance and 
governance seem to be interrelated. It turns out that under very bad political and 
institutional conditions, aid can have a negative, rather than a positive impact on 
primary enrolment and completion. This may be interpreted as an indication of 
fungibility of resources, whereby more aid frees government resources for activities that 
are detrimental to the country’s overall development. 
Simulations provide some evidence that the impact of aid to educations is highest when 
(i) aid resources remain a rather limited share of national resources (diminishing 
returns) and (ii) good governance in terms of political rights and civil liberties provide a 
positive environment for learning and its application in the society and on the labor 
market. Nevertheless, even under very positive circumstances, the average effect of aid 
remains rather small. 
With this result, our evidence for the education sector comes quite close to the 
conclusion one might draw from the general aid effectiveness literature. While getting 
conceptionally closer to the micro-level than the macroeconomic studies on aid and 
growth, we are far from obtaining the highly optimistic results suggested by project 
evaluations. Given that our results on the impact of aid are as weak as at the macro 
level, despite the considerable reduction of complexity in the relationships to be 
considered, these results do not seem to be a simple reflection of omitted variable bias. 
It remains that our study suffers from imprecise and incomplete information on many 
variables, which could only be taken into account by imputations and the inclusion of 
missing value indicators in our regressions. This may imply that the actual effect of aid 
is somewhat underestimated here. However, as long as the potential bias is not really 
substantial, this would not alter our general conclusions. 
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Annex 1: List of variables 
Variable name Definition Sources 
 
NER 
COMPLETION 
 
EDUCAID 
EDUCAIDn 
EDUCAIDg 
 
 
EXPEDUC 
PTR 
YOUNG-POP 
GDPcap 
BUDGET 
INFLATION 
OPEN 
FREE 
 
 
ENERGYAID 
 
net primary enrolment (%)  
primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) 
 
aid allocated to education (constant 2001 US$, millions) 
EDUCAID (constant 2001 US$) / population 
EDUCAID (US$) / GDP·100 
 
 
national education expenditure (% of GNI)  
pupil-teacher ratio in primary education 
population aged 0-14 (% of total population) 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)  
budget surplus (% of GDP) 
inflation (consumer prices, % annual) 
openness (export+import, % of GDP) 
Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties
(1-7, whereby 1 shows the highest degree of freedom) 
 Freedom House (2005) 
 
aid allocated to energy production and planning 
(constant 2001 US$, millions) 
 
WDI (World Bank 2003, 2005) 
WDI (World Bank, 2005) 
 
commitments: IDS/CRS, table 1 
disbursements: IDS/CRS, table 5 
technical cooperation: IDS/DAC, 
table 5a  (OECD/DAC 2004) 
 
WDI (World Bank 2003) 
WDI (World Bank 2003, 2005) 
WDI (World Bank 2003, 2005) 
WDI (World Bank 2003, 2005) 
WDI (World Bank 2005) 
WDI (World Bank 2003, 2005) 
WDI (World Bank 2003, 2005) 
 
 
commitments: IDS/CRS, Table 1 
disbursements: IDS/CRS, Table 5
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technical cooperation: IDS/DAC, 
Table 5a  (OECD/DAC 2004) 
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